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IMAGINATION IN NORTHANGER ABBEY
PETER L. DeROSE
LAMAR UNIVERSITY
I
Northanger Abbey is not only a bold parody of the Gothic-
 
sentimental fiction popular at the time of its composition but
 
also, as  
many critics agree, a complex parody. In fact, A. Walton Litz claims
 
it 
would be a mistake to read the novel as a
 
“straightforward drama in  
which...the disordered Imagination is put to flight by Reason”;
 paraphrasing Lionel Trilling, he asserts that Catherine’s suspicion of violence and uncertainty lurking beneath the surface of English
 society is “nearer the truth than the complacent conviction, shared by
 the readers of Mrs. Radcliffe, that life in the Home
 
Counties  is always  
sane and orderly.”1 Andrew Wright concludes that though we must
 dismiss the Gothic world as inadequate and false, “we cannot alto
­gether apprehend the real world by good sense alone. Good sense,
 ironically, is limited too.”2 More recently, Alistair Duckworth argues
 that although Northanger Abbey undercuts Catherine’s “imagina
­tive fantasy,” the novel also dramatizes “the fallibility of the rational
 outlook.”3 Implicit in each of these positions is the assumption that
 the Gothic (or sentimental) and real worlds are not altogether differ
­ent, and that together Imagination and Reason will discover this
 similarity. Such an assumption, however, should not be made because
 it misrepresents the Lockean epistemology that underlies the literary
 burlesque in Northanger Abbey and, equally significant, because it
 misinterprets Jane Austen’s moral intention, shared by writers like
 Samuel Johnson, to portray realistically the social dangers of every
­day life.
To claim, as Wright does, that there is “more on earth
 
than mere  
common sense,” or as Duckworth claims, that Catherine’
s
 “imagina ­
tive responses” lead to an “undefined recognition” of the truth, or to
 suggest, as Litz and Trilling do, that Catherine’s imagination comes
 closer to the truth than her reason does, not only places the primary
 burden of knowing on the mental activity of reason or imagination,
 but also attributes to the imagination more truth-finding functions
 than Jane Austen and most other writers of her age would have
 believed possible.1 It is more accurate to say that in the properly
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balanced mind, all mental activity—whether imaginative, rational,
 
judgmental, or volitional—is secondary to the direct experience of
 sensory reality, and is, apart from experience, seriously suspect.5
 Applied to Northanger Abbey, this distinction leads to important conclusions about the parodic and realistic dimensions of the novel.
 First, Jane Austen’
s
 burlesque goes far beyond parody of mere literary  
form—whether Gothic or sentimental—to expose what Samuel John
­son calls in Rasselas the “dangerous prevalence of imagination.”6
 Second, by teaching heroine and reader alike to see things not as they
 are imagined but as they actually are, the comic-realistic episodes of
 Northanger Abbey serve a genuine moral purpose—to provide “the
 young, the ignorant, and the idle,” as Dr. Johnson characterized the
 readers of popular fiction, with “lectures of conduct, and introductions
 into life.”7
II
To appreciate fully Jane Austen’
s
 burlesque of the imagination,  
we must recall the two philosophical premises on which John Locke’s
 highly influential epistemology is built—that the mind at birth is a
 tabula rasa, which possesses no innate ideas, and that all our ideas
 (and all our knowledge) originate in inescapable human experience,
 either through sense-perception or reflection. “All those sublime
 thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as
 
high as heaven  
itself, take their rise and footing here,” Locke formulates in one of the
 most famous sentences in An
 
Essay Concerning Human Understand ­
ing; “in all the great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote
 speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond
 those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contempla
­tion.”8 Since the mind, in all its rational thinking, can contemplate
 “no other immediate object but its own ideas” offered through sense
­perception and reflection, all knowledge is “nothing but the percep
­tion of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and
 repugnancy of
 
any of our ideas.”9
Jane Austen may or may not have read Locke’
s
 Essay, but she  
was
 
familiar with Samuel Johnson’ s essays and with Boswell’s Life of  
Johnson.10 Heavily influenced by Locke’
s
 theory of cognition, John ­
son’s thought reflects the philosophical importance Locke attached to
 the experiential basis of ideas and of knowledge. Johnson once told
 Boswell: “Human experience, which is constantly contradicting the
­
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ory, is the great test of truth. ”11 He is also reported to have told George
 
Staunton, who was about to
 
travel to America for scientific purposes:  
“Trust as little as you can to report;
 
examine all you can by  your own  
senses.”12 Again and again, whether speaking casually or writing
 formally, he asserts that we do not know anything except what we
 have learned from direct or vicarious experience.13
In acquiring knowledge, that is, in the process by which ideas and
 
images are presented to the mind, and are arranged, classified,
 abstracted, and compared, the faculty of imagination (synonymous in
 the eighteenth century with “fancy”) plays a necessary, if somewhat
 humble, function. Primarily a visualizing power, “imagination” is
 defined in Johnson’
s
 Dictionary as “Fancy; the power of forming ideal  
pictures; the power of representing things absent to one’
s
 self or  
others.”11 Imagination, however, frequently leads us into error, for
 although it can accurately represent images or ideas to the mind, it
 can also rearrange
 
their parts in  ways that do not correspond with the  
experienced nature of things—thus the distinction in Locke’
s
 termi ­
nology between “real” and “fantastical”
 
ideas. “By real ideas,”Locke  
explains, “I mean such
 
as have a foundation in nature; such as have a  
conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their
 archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical, I call such as have no
 
founda ­
tion in nature, nor have any conformity with the reality of being to
 which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes.”15
Dr. Johnson’s distrust of the imagination derives, therefore, from
 
the traditional belief that by so transforming real images or ideas this
 mental faculty entices man to escape reality (and to avoid action) by
 withdrawing into an illusory world. In Rambler no. 125, Johnson
 refers to the imagination as a “licentious and vagrant faculty, unsus
­ceptible of
 
limitations, and impatient of restraint” (Works, 4:300). In  
Rambler no. 89 he
 
draws the brief portrait of the dreamer, who “retires  
to his apartments, shuts out the cares and interruptions of mankind,
 and abandons himself to his own fancy.” In
 
his solitude “new  worlds  
rise up before him, one image is followed by another, and a long
 succession of delights dances round him.” When at length he returns
 to society, the dreamer becomes peevish “because he cannot model it
 to his own will....The infatuation strengthens by degrees, and,
 
like the  
poison of opiates, weakens
 
his powers, without any external symptom  
of malignity” (Works, 4:106). The dreamer later reemerges in Rasselas
 with a slightly fuller characterization as the obsessed, paranoiac
 astronomer, who personifies “the dangerous prevalence of imagina
­tion.” As Imlac explains to Rasselas:
3
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There is no man whose imagination does not sometimes pre
­
dominate over his reason, who can regulate his attention wholly
 by his will, and 
whose
 ideas will come and go at his command. No  
man will be found in whose mind airy notions do not sometimes
 tyrannize, and force him to hope or fear beyond the limits 
of
 sober  
probability. All power of fancy over reason is a degree of insanity;
 
but
 while this power is such as we can controul and repress, it is  
not visible to others, nor considered as any depravation of the
 mental faculties: it is not pronounced madness but when it
 becomes ungovernable, and apparently influences speech or
 action.
* * *
In time some particular train of ideas fixes the attention; all
 
other intellectual gratifications are rejected, the mind, in weari
­ness or leisure, recurs constantly to the favourite conception, and
 feasts on the 
luscious
 falsehood, whenever she is offended with the  
bitterness of truth. By degrees, the reign of fancy is confirmed; she
 grows first imperious, and in time despotick. Then fictions begin
 to operate as realities, false opinions fasten upon the mind, and
 life passes in dreams of rapture or of anguish.16
In all her novels, Jane Austen dramatizes the imagination’s
 
“dreams of rapture” and
 
“luscious falsehood,” which Imlac with such  
alarm describes to Rasselas. When Elinor Dashwood, in Sense and
 Sensibility, refuses to speculate about the fragments of Colonel Bran
­don’
s
 mysterious narrative, for example, her sister Marianne, we  are  
told, would have speedily and mistakenly fabricated an entire story
 “under her active imagination.” In Pride and Prejudice, the high-
 spirited Lydia Bennet, who marries a
 
charming rake, tends to see  the  
world through 
“
the creative eye of fancy.” Edmund Bertram, in Mans ­
field Park, for a long time forms an illusory conception of Mary
 Crawford, who he eventually tells Fanny has been “the creature of
 [his] own
 
imagination.” Emma Woodhouse, an extraordinary “imagi ­
nist” who can
 
take “an idea and make every thing bend  to it,” learns  
after many blunders the necessary “subjection of the fancy to the
 understanding.” Even
 
Anne Elliot of Persuasion,  the most rational of  
all Jane Austen’s heroines, recognizes with embarrassment, “What
 wild imaginations one forms, where dear self is concerned!”17
Catherine Morland, more than any other Austen heroine, is par
­
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ticularly susceptible to the imagination’s “luscious falsehood” and
 
“dreams of rapture.” A few days after her introduction to Henry
 Tilney, for example, she searches for him all over the Upper and Lower
 Rooms of Bath, but her inquiries are futile, for Henry has unexpect
­edly left the city, without even leaving his name in the social register.
 “This sort of mysteriousness, which is always 
so
 becoming in a hero,”  
Jane Austen
 
comment , “threw a fresh grace in Catherine’s imagina ­
tion around his person and manners, and increased her anxiety to
 know more of him” (35-36). Unable to learn anything of Henry’s
 absence from her friends, the
 
Thorpes, but encouraged by Isabella to  
think of him, Catherine indulges
 
her imagination on Henry’s charac ­
ter, and “his impression on her fancy was not suffered to weaken.”
 John and Isabella’
s
 plan to ride to Blaize Castle is especially delight ­
ful to Catherine’s imagination, disappointed as she has been by her
 interrupted engagement with the Tilneys. “The delight of exploring
 an edifice like Udolpho, as her fancy represented Blaize Castle to be,”
 Jane Austen explains, “was such a counterpoise of good, as might
 console her for almost anything” (86). General Tilney’
s
 invitation  
later to visit Northanger Abbey is even more delightful in Catherine’s
 imagination, for her “passion for ancient edifices was next in degree
 to her passion for Henry Tilney—and castles and abbeys made usu
­ally the charm of those reveries which his image did not fill” (141).
 Even after Catherine is disabused of all her fancied expectations
 about Northanger and the General, she looks forward with still
 greater imaginary delights to Henry’
s
 humble parsonage at Wood ­
ston: “What a revolution in her
 
ideas! she, who  had so longed to  be in  
an
 
abbey!  Now,  there was nothing so charming to her imagination as  
the unpretending comfort of a well-connected Parsonage, something
 like Fullerton, but better” (212).
Although Catherine is particularly
 
susceptible to  “dreams of rap ­
ture,” no
 
one in Northanger Abbey, save perhaps Henry Tilney, really  
escapes the deceptions of
 
an active fancy. When her social climbing  
friend Isabella receives James’
s
 letter announcing his parents’  appro ­
val
 
of their engagement, she (mistakenly) “knew enough to feel secure  
of an honourable and speedy establishment, and her imagination took
 a rapid flight over its attendant felicities” (122). Even as reliable a
 figure
 
as Eleanor Tilney  acknowledges her susceptibility to the decep ­
tions of the fancy. Though she recognizes, in one of her many conver
­sations with Catherine, that historians are as capable as literary
 writers of “flights of fancy” and of “imagination,” she claims, “1 am
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fond of history—and
 
am very well contented to take the false with the  
true” (109). As
 
for the imaginary “embellishments” with which histo ­
rians sometimes write, Eleanor concludes: “They are embellishments,
 and 1 like them as such. If a speech be well drawn up, 1 read it with
 pleasure, by whomsoever it may be made—and probably with much
 greater, if the production of 
Mr.
 Hume or Mr. Robertson, than if the  
genuine words of Caractacus, Agricola, or Alfred the Great.”
 Although Eleanor knows that the historian’
s
 pleasurable “flights of  
fancy” are not true, Catherine does not.
Thus far, Catherine’
s
 imagination has been responsible for rela ­
tively
 
harmless sallies  of unreality. It is capable of much worse. As Dr.  
Johnson never tired of pointing out, “All power of fancy over reason is
 a degree of insanity.”18 A faithful representation of the prevailing
 Lockean epistemology, the poet Imlac’
s
 discourse to Rasselas on the  
ideas that despotically take hold of the mind recalls the passage in
 Locke’
s
 chapter “Of the Association of Ideas,” in which he observes:  
“I
 
shall be pardoned for calling [an unreasonable association of ideas]  
by 
so
 harsh a name as madness,  when it is considered that opposition  
to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is
 scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all
 occasions, argue or do
 
as in some cases  he constantly does, would not  
be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation.”19 Some of our
 ideas, in Locke’
s
 theory, have a “natural” correspondence “founded in  
their peculiar beings.”20 Yet they become so united in men’s minds
 that it is very hard to separate them. “The ideas of goblins and
 sprites,” Locke explains in a characteristic example, “have really no
 more to do with darkness than light: yet let but a foolish maid
 
incul ­
cate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together,
 possibly he shall never be able
 
to separate them again so long as he  
lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful
 ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear
 
the one  
than the other.”21
Jane Austen, it would be fair to say, considers Catherine Mor
­
land’s chance association of ideas in her
 
imagination as  a “degree of  
insanity.” In a comic but significant conversation with Eleanor and
 Henry Tilney, for example, Jane Austen anticipates the “madness” to
 which Catherine’s imagination eventually leads when the young
 heroine informs her friends that “something very shocking indeed,
 will soon come out in London,” that she does not know who the author
 is, that it is to be “more horrible than any thing we have met with yet,”
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and that she “shall expect murder and every thing of the kind” (112).
 
Misinterpreting Catherine’
s
 rather obvious references to the publica ­
tion of a new Gothic novel, Eleanor imagines instead a large-scale
 social riot. Henry therefore steps in to clear the air, and reminds his
 sister
 
of the danger of mental imbalance: “My dear Eleanor, the riot is  
only in your
 
own  brain. The confusion there is scandalous.” Asserting  
that Eleanor has not rationally conceived that “such words could
 relate only to a circulating library,” Henry describes for the two young
 women Eleanor’s imaginary horrors—“a mob of three thousand men
 assembled in St. George’
s
 Fields; the Bank attacked, the Tower threat ­
ened, the streets of London flowing with blood, a detachment of the
 12th Light Dragoons, (the hopes of the nation,) called up
 
from North ­
ampton to quell the insurgents, and the gallant Captain Frederick
 Tilney, in the moment of charging at the head of his troop, knocked off
 his horse by a brickbat from an
 
upper window” (113). Although Elea ­
nor is the immediate object of Henry’
s
 ridicule, the larger butt of irony  
here is the naive imagination, which functions without commonsense
 attention, observation, and experience. To credit Henry’
s
 rebuke of  
imaginary terrors with a larger and “subversive” dramatic irony
 which ultimately vindicates the imagination, since his description is
 constructed out of the actual details of the 1780 Gordon Riots and since
 the entire scene foreshadows the metamorphosis of Catherine’s imagi
­nary horrors at Northanger Abbey into the real social dangers of
 Bath—as several critics have done—is to misread the pervasive, fun
­damental irony that imagination, in operating independently of real,
 factual experience, has led the individual to a kind of intellectual
 disorder, which Henry calls a “riot” in the brain.22
Surely the principal meaning emerging from Catherine’s ex
­
periences at Northanger Abbey is that her imagination—like Elea
­nor’s in this scene—has led to an aptly described mental “riot,” in
 which Gothic expectations are thoroughly entangled
 
in her mind.  Her  
premature ideas about the
 
abbey, for example, are a disturbing collec ­
tion of Gothic ramparts and cloisters, “long damp passages,” “narrow
 cells and ruined chapel,” “traditional legends,” and “some awful
 memorials of an injured and
 
ill-fated nun.” So active are Catherine’ s 
thoughts that even after her inquiries are matter-of-factly answered
 by Eleanor, Catherine is assured of Northanger Abbey conforming to
 her imaginary expectations. Teasing Catherine about these expecta
­tions on the drive to the abbey, Henry smiles and
 
inquires if she has  
“formed a very favourable idea of the abbey” (157). “To be sure I
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have," she replies, “
Is
 not it a fine old place, just like what one reads  
about?” But a “fine old place" and “what one reads about” are hardly
 the same thing. Entering the grounds of the abbey along a smooth and
 level road of fine gravel without obstacle or alarm of any kind seems to
 her “odd and inconsistent” with 
her
 preconceived ideas (161). She does  
not expect to see furniture that displays only modern elegance. The
 fireplace of her imagination, with its ample and ponderous carvings of
 former times, proves to be only a “Rumford, with slabs of plain though
 handsome marble, and ornaments over it of the prettiest English
 China.” The Gothic windows, too, all “so large, so clear, so bright,” are
 “yet less what her fancy had portrayed." In fact, “to an imagination
 which had hoped for the smallest divisions, and the heaviest stone
­work, for painted glass, dirt and cobwebs, the difference was very
 distressing” (162).
Catherine’s habitual association of Gothic structures with the
 
Gothic horrors she has read about is, however, not easily disen
­tangled. Her imagination presses forward to find something distress
­ing in 
her
 situation. In her room she finds a large chest, which to  
Catherine’s imagination is very strange. It does not occur to her that
 the remains of its silver handles have been worn with age. On the
 contrary, her fancy suggests that they have been prematurely broken
 “by some strange violence” (163). On the lid is clearly painted the
 letter “T,” which she might reasonably assume represents “Tilney,”
 but to Catherine’s imagination it is a “mysterious cypher.” She opens
 the chest only to find a white cotton bedspread. On her return to the
 room after dinner, the sight of the old chest is an embarrassing
 reminder of the “causeless fears of 
an
 idle fancy,” yet the sudden  
discovery of 
an
 antique black cabinet only generates her fanciful  
associations once more. The following morning’s examination
 teaches her the “absurdity of her recent fancies”—the corrective to her
 imaginary ideas being the actual material evidence before her eyes
 (173). Glancing over the page with a startled look, Catherine wonders,
 “Could it be possible, or did not 
her
 senses play her false?—An inven ­
tory of linen, in coarse and modern characters, seemed all that was
 before her! If the evidence of sight might be trusted, she held a wash
­ing bill in 
her
 hand” (172).
Though humbled by such 
an
 experience, Catherine fabricates an 
even larger train of ideas about General Tilney. On the flimsy basis of
 the General’s unwillingness to show her a part of the abbey and of his
 refusal to join her and Eleanor on his wife’s favorite walk, Catherine is
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convinced that the General must have
 
tortured and murdered her, or  
at least permanently immured her. Learning that the General was
 dissatisfied with Mrs. Tilney’
s
 portrait and that it hangs in  Eleanor’s  
bedroom, instead of the drawing room where
 
it was intended, Cathe ­
rine most unreasonably surmises, “Here was another proof. A
 portrait—very like—of a departed wife, not valued by the husband!—
 He must have been dreadfully cruel to her!” (181). When the General
 calls her hastily from one end of the house, his “evident desire of
 preventing such an examination” is an additional piece of proof in her
 mind. “Something,” she concludes, “was certainly to be concealed; her
 fancy, though it had trespassed lately once or twice, could not mislead
 her here” (186). As though in mockery of the reasonable exertion of a
 balanced mind, Catherine imagines “in all probability” that the Gen
­eral
 
has  never entered his wife’ s room since his dreadful torture of her.  
Horrible ideas spring into Catherine’
s
 mind, and she finds many  
examples to justify her blackest suspicions. At length Catherine
 decides to explore the rooms and find material proof to satisfy her
 suspicions, but all she discovers is a “large, well-proportioned apart
­ment, an handsome dimity bed, arranged as unoccupied with an
 housemaid’s care, a bright Bath stove, mahogany wardrobes, and
 neatly-painted chairs, on which the warm beams of a western sun
 gaily poured through two sash windows”—metaphorically shedding
 on Catherine’
s
 mind “a ray of common sense” (193). Henry Tilney’s  
pointed reminder to her, when he discovers her in the empty room,
 emphasizes the significant
 
aspect of her cognitive  awakening. “What  
have you been judging from?” he asks; “consult your own understand
­ing, your own sense of the probable, your own observation, of what 
is passing around you....Dearest Miss Morland, what ideas have you
 been admitting?” (197-98). Judgment, understanding, observation, a
 sense of the probable—all play a significant role in Catherine’
s
 release  
from the associations of her imagination. The “visions of romance,”
 we are told, are now over. Completely awakened, Catherine now opens
 her eyes to the “extravagance of her late fancies” and
 
to the “liberty  
which her imagination had dared to take.” That evening, before she
 retires, she reflects on the foolishness which “had been all a volun
­tary, self-created delusion, each trifling circumstance receiving impor
­tance from an imagination resolved on alarm, and every thing forced
 to
 
bend to one purpose by a mind which, before she entered the Abbey,  
had been craving to be frightened” (200). Far from being a source of
 truth, Catherine’
s
 imagination, because of its exaggeration and false  
9
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association of Gothic-romantic ideas with reality, is invariably the
 
locus of deception.
III
Complementing the broad parody of the imagination in Nor
­
thanger Abbey is Jane Austen’s comic representation of real life,
 which draws bold attention to the way character and behavior actu
­ally or commonly appear, and not the way they are imagined in
 fictional romances. Running counter to the reader’
s
 expectations, the  
comic-realistic narrative of Catherine Morland’s life is an anti
­romance, in which, as Johnson explains in Rambler 
no.
 4, “life [is  
exhibited] in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily
 happen in the world, and influenced by
 
passions and qualities  which  
are really to
 
be found in conversing with mankind” (Works,  3:19).  “No  
one who had ever seen Catherine Morland in her infancy,” Jane
 Austen opens her anti-romance, “would have supposed her born to be
 an heroine” (14). Not
 
only are her family ordinary and “plain matter-  
of-fact people” who experience the “common feelings of common life,”
 but Catherine herself has “by nature nothing heroic about her.” Her
 father is not a domestic
 
tyrant, and her mother did not die—after the  
fashion of romances—in childbirth. Catherine is not beautiful, and
 she is not prodigiously accomplished. There
 
is no heroic youth in the  
neighborhood to fall in love with, no young lord, foundling, squire’s
 son, no ward brought up in her family.23 Catherine’
s
 entry into the  
public life of Bath, moreover, is marked by nothing unusual or roman
­tic. At her first dance, she is not, in the hyperbolical language of
 romance, called “a divinity” by anyone (23). Her first conversation
 with Henry Tilney in the Lower Rooms involves “such matters as
 naturally arose from the objects around them” (25). Her conversation
 with Eleanor Tilney involves “common-place chatter,” and Eleanor’s
 manner during this exchange shows none of the “exaggerated feel
­ings of extatic delight or inconceivable vexation on every trifling
 occurrence” (56-57).
For all Catherine’s impressionability to her friend Isabella’
s 
affectations and recommended reading, she possesses a common
 degree of common sense. When Catherine sees Mr. Tilney speaking
 with a fashionable, attractive young woman, who is leaning on his
 arm, for example, she immediately assumes the woman is his sister,
 thus losing, in a characteristically anti-heroic manner, an opportun
­
10
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ity of considering him lost
 
to her for ever, by being already married.  
Jane Austen contrasts the falsifying romance version of such a situa
­tion with the realistic version, founded on probabilities and facts:
Guided only by what was simple and probable, it had never
 
entered
 her head that Mr. Tilney could be married; he had not  
behaved, he had not talked, like the married men to whom she had  
been used; he had never 
mentioned
 a wife, and he had acknowl ­
edged 
a
 sister. From these circumstances sprang the instant con ­
clusion of his sister’s now being by his side; and therefore, instead
 of turning 
a
 deathlike paleness, and falling in a fit on Mrs. Allen’s  
bosom, Catherine sat erect, in the perfect use of her senses, and
 
with
 cheeks only a little redder than usual. (53)
Often, in fact, guided not by her active imagination but by what is
 
“simple and probable,” by “circumstances,” by observation and
 remembrance, and by the “perfect use of her
 
senses,” Catherine’s life 
is used to demonstrate, as Jane Austen says, that “strange things
 
may  
be  generally accounted for if their cause be fairly searched out” (16).  
Consequently, after a bewildering and short-lived excursion among
 the fantasies of romance at Northanger Abbey, Catherine resolves to
 act with “the greatest good
 
sense” and learns  to accept the “anxieties  
of common life” instead of the “alarms’ of romance” (201). When
 General Tilney dismisses her from the abbey, having learned of her
 ordinary background, Catherine realizes that the anxiety thus
 
caused  
is “mournfully superior in reality and substance” than any she has  
encountered in Mrs. Radcliffe’s romances, for it has “foundation in
 fact” and “in probability.” With her mind now focused on “actual
 
and  
natural evil,” she returns to her home in a hack post-chaise
 
“without  
[heroic] accident or alarm.” A “probable circumstance” (Eleanor’s
 marriage to a man of fortune placates the General’s greed) facilitates
 her wedding with Henry (25). Henry’s affection for Catherine,
 moreover, we are told, has originated in “nothing better than grati
­tude” for Catherine’s affection for him. “It is a new circumstance in
 romance, and dreadfully derogatory of an heroine’s dignity,” Jane
 Austen reminds us, “but if it be as new
 
in common life, the  credit  of a  
wild imagination will at least be all my own” (243).
The comic realism in Northanger Abbey serves an obvious moral
 
purpose, best described by Johnson’s Rambler no. 4, in discussing
 novels that “serve as lectures of conduct, and introductions into life.”
 Unlike romances, in which “every transaction and sentiment [is] so
 remote from all that passes among men, that the reader [is] in very
11
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little danger of making any applications to himself" and in which
 
 
“virtues and crimes [are] equally beyond his sphere of activity,” nov-
 els which portray the life of an adventurer who is “levelled with the
 rest of the world” and who “ acts in such scenes of the universal drama,
 as may be the lot of any other man” can be morally instructive (Works,
3:21):
The purpose of these writings 
is
 surely not only to show man ­
kind, but to 
provide
 that they may be seen hereafter with less  
hazard; to teach the means 
of
 avoiding the snares which are laid  
 by Treachery for Innocence, without infusing any wish for that
 superiority with which the betrayer flatters his vanity; to give the
 power of counteracting fraud, without the temptation to practice
 it; to initiate youth by mock encounters in the art of necessary
 defence, and to increase prudence without impairing virtue.
(Works, 3:22-23;
The “mock encounters” that the innocent Catherine experiences in
 
 
her relationships with her false friends, the Thorpes, and with Gen-
 eral Tilney illuminate for her and for the reader at once that real
 people are more complex than imaginary heroes and that real life
 situations ironically can be more deceptive and treacherous than
 those encountered in fiction.
 That Catherine is the innocent in this moral paradigm  is evident
from her naive, uninformed responses to lifelike situations. When she
 first leaves home, she goes “looking forward to pleasures untasted and
 unalloyed, and free from
 
the apprehension of evil as from the knowl ­
edge of it” (237). Almost at the close of her story, too, Henry is referring
 
 
to Catherine when he  asks Eleanor to be ready to welcome a sister-in-
 law who is “open, candid, artless, guileless, with affections strong but
 simple, forming no pretensions, and knowing no disguise” (206). At
 every turn in her development, Catherine displays her innocence, as
 when with childlike simplicity, she tells John Thorpe that to marry for
 money is “the wickedest th ng in existence” (124). Estimating charac-
 ter and behavior in terms of her own naive imagination, she imputes
 nothing but good nature to the impudent, conceited, and disingenuous
 Thorpe and to his selfish, shrewd, and calculating sister Isabella; and
 for a while she is completely deceived by the smooth social hypocrisy
 and mercenariness of General Tilney.
 Catherine and the reader alike learn two  significant lessons  from
 her encounters with the Thorpes and General Tilney. Both learn what
 Johnson calls the “art of necessary defence” against the real fraudu-
12
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lence and treachery of human society. More
 
significantly, their intro ­
duction to the ways of the world teaches them that human nature is
 more complex and difficult to understand than one naively
 imagines.21 They both recognize, to use Johnson’s words, the limits of
 “virtues and crimes” that exist within the probable “sphere of
 [human] activity” (Rambler 4, Works, 3:21). For a time both Catherine
 and the reader believe, for example, that the General is one of those
 “unnatural and overdrawn” characters of the imagination, who are
 represented in fictional romances
 
like The Mysteries of Udolpho, and  
who are capable of unalloyed 
evil
 (181). As Dr. Johnson observes,  
however, “to imagine that every one who is not completely good is
 irrecoverably abandoned, is to suppose that all are capable of the
 same
 
degree of excellence; it is indeed to exact, from all, that perfection  
which none can attain” (Rambler 70—Works, 4:6). Catherine’s awak
­ening into the real world of experience gives the
 
lie to this imaginary  
assumption:
Charming as were all Mrs. Radcliffe’s works, and charming
 
even as were the works of all her imitators, it was not in them
 perhaps that human nature, at least in the midland counties of
 England, was to be looked for....Among the Alps and Pyrenees,
 perhaps, there were no mixed characters. There, such as were not
 spotless as an angel, might have the dispositions of a fiend. But
 
in 
England it was not so; among the English, she believed, in their
 hearts and habits, there was a general though unequal mixture of
 good and bad. Upon this conviction, she would not be surprised if
 even 
in
 Henry and Eleanor Tilney, some slight imperfection  
might hereafter appear; and upon this conviction she need not
 fear to acknowledge some actual specks 
in
 the character of their  
father, who, though cleared from the grossly injurious suspicions
 which she must ever blush to have entertained, she did believe,
 upon serious consideration, to be not perfectly amiable. (200)
Though there is much irony at Catherine’
s
 expense,  in believing that  
unnatural characters may yet live in the Alps and Pyrenees, Cathe
­rine’s reflections, thoroughly consistent with her unsophisticated
 character, nevertheless represent a major advance in her moral educa
­tion. Catherine acquires the Johnsonian view that the heroes and
 villains
 
of imaginary  romances are  really “beings of another species”  
whose actions are “regulated upon motives of their own, and who
 [have] neither faults nor excellencies in common” with humanity
 {Rambler 4— Works, 3:21). Recognizing through experience the com
­plexity of human character and behavior, Catherine, as well as the
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reader of Northanger Abbey, learns that real people are not usually
 
murderers, but are more frequently mercenary, cunning, hypocritical
 and vain—and sometimes, as with Eleanor and Henry, even habitu
­ally, though not perfectly, good.
Common sense, experience, and observation, then, are ultimately
 
what rescue
 
Catherine Morland and the reader from the illusory world  
of the imagination, and restore them to a sobering apprehension of
 reality. To say more than this—that Jane Austen’s irony, directed
 primarily against the
 
active imagination and the Gothic-sentimental  
romances that nurture it, turns upon itself to undercut even
 
the direct  
experience of sensory reality—is to misrepresent the Lockean episte
­mology upon which her parody is built, and to misconstrue her evident
 moral intention. In Northanger Abbey Jane Austen narrates the
 amusing story of an ingenue encountering and learning from the
 deceptions of the real world; with a traditional moral purpose and an
 eighteenth-century epistemology she achieves a complex fusion of
 bold parody and broad comic-realism.
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